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ENVIRONMENT
Protect the environment instead of the bureaucracy
Putting the "Law" Back
into Environment Law
BY DAVID SCHOENBROD MERICA'S MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE HAS
done a terrible job with pollution control. True,
the environment is much cleaner, but pollution
was being reduced as quickly before the adminis-
trative state took over in the early 1970s as afterwards, as Indur Goklany has shown. The earlier progress was made through
a combination of private action, common law, and ad hoc regulation, mostly at the state and local level. What the adminis-
trative state added was comprehensive, command-and-control management from on high. The result is an intrusive,
inflexible system that bureaucratizes all life that it touch-
es, yet has left the public more anxious about pollution
than ever. Such anxiety fuels the growing power of the
administrative state.
The state's perversities have prompted some to argue
for a return to the common law as the way to control pol-
lution. Statists respond with a litany of reasons the com-
mon law would fail to adequately control pollution in the
modern world. Some are telling. Proponents of a return
to common law reply that the state too has its flaws. That
it does. But each side refuses to face up to its own failings.
Each side insists that its own creed be followed literally.
Departing from such fundamentalism, I suggest a
realistic way to control modern pollution according to
the spirit but not the letter of the common law. I first
explain why the common law alone cannot adequately
control pollution today. I then show why the modern
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administrative state is such an ugly thing despite the well
intentioned dreams and sense of superiority of those of
us who spawned it. Finally, I argue that we can preserve
much of what is beautiful about the common law in a
system of pollution control that can work, and has
worked, in the modern world.
The Common Law Cannot Do the Whole Job
WHEN IT COMES TO THE COMMON LAW OF THE ENVIRON-
ment, there are believers, nonbelievers, and wanna-be-
believers. I am a wanna-be-believer. I want to believe that
the common law could replace the administrative state. But
it cannot because it would encounter overwhelming prob-
lems both in judging liability and in providing remedies.
Liability for air pollution cannot be based upon the
kind of absolute rule that defines liability in the common
law of trespass: no trespassing. If it were illegal to emit
particles of air pollution that trespass on another's land,
not only industrial society but all human activity would
be illegal. We cannot grow beans, even the organic way,
without kicking up dust, or cook them, for that matter,
without emitting fumes.
The common law in fact judges air pollution through
the lens of the law of nuisance, not trespass. In 1611, the
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court in William Aldred's Case held that the defendant com-
mitted a nuisance by maintaining a pigsty near the plain-
tiff's parlor. The court reasoned that it is a nuisance to use
one's property in a way that injures that of another. But
that reason, standing alone, begs the question. There has
to be a place for pigsties as well as parlors. Just how is a
judge to know which is in the wrong place? In the early
English cases, that understanding was based on custom.
But custom provides no such understanding today. Liv-
ing in a world where change has become customary,
where land use patterns shift, new technologies emerge,
and medical discoveries show accustomed levels of pollu-
tion to be unhealthy, we do not want law to hold that
what should be is what has been.
Modern courts have tried to supplement custom by
looking also at the benefit of defendants' activity in com-
parison to the harm to the plaintiff. But then the judge is
making a policy judgment and not mirroring the customs
of the people. This is not common law but ad hominem
regulation, and without democratic accountability.
Even if common law courts could deal with liability,
they still cannot provide adequate remedies in many cases.
Courts award damages only for harms proved to be caused
by the defendant and injunctions only to ward off harms
proved to be imminent and substantial. Overcoming such
barriers to relief would be easy in a case of a pigsty and a
parlor, but impossible in the more typical modern case
where a pollutant presents nontrivial risks of great harm.
Plaintiffs in such cases usually cannot prove harm by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, or anything like it.
The Modern Administrative State Is Ugly
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE BEGAN IN AMERICA WITH
the Progressives at the dawn of the 20th century. Those
early elitists thought they could supply better govern-
ment than had common law courts and popularly elect-
ed legislatures, by empowering administrative agencies
-staffed of course by people like themselves-to gov-
ern "in the public interest." The agencies were a big
departure from the common law, but there still was an
essential similarity. Both common law courts and agen-
cies sought to vindicate society's values-the courts by
enforcing society's binding customs, the agencies by
governing in "the public interest," as the Progressives
understood the term.
Starting somewhere around 1970, the administrative
state ceased trying to vindicate society and started trying
to improve it. It would be made to live according to ideals
that were intellectually generated from on high rather
than its own values. For example, the newly created Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) was told to try to
force society to end all water pollution by 1985. The state
had started to try to intrude itself on society far more
aggressively than in the past because the elite itself had
changed. In Drawing Life: Surviving the Unabomber, David
Gelernter, a Yale computer professor whose splendid
writing got more of the attention that it deserves after he
was wounded by the Unabomber, remarks
Today's elite is intellectualized, the old elite was not...
The old elite got on fairly well with the nation it set
over. But the enmity between Intellectual and Bourgeois
is sheepman against cattleman, farm against city, Army
versus Navy: a clich6 but real. Ever since there was a
middle class, intellectuals have despised it. When intel-
lectuals were outsiders, their loves and hates never mat-
tered much. But, today they are running things, and
their tastes matter greatly.
Members of the old social upper-crust elite were
richer and better educated than the public at large,
but they approached life on basically the same terms.
The public went to church and so did they. The pub-
lic went into the army and so did they... They agreed
(this being America) that art was a waste, scientists
were questionable, engineering and machines and
progress and nature were good-some of the old-time
attitudes made sense and some didn't, but the staff
and the bosses were basically in accord...
Today's elite loathes the public. Nothing personal,
just a fundamental difference in world view, but the
hatred is unmistakable.
The seed of the new elite was in the old elite's ratio-
nale that intellect justifies the exercise of power without
accountability. Having taught that creed from the begin-
ning of the 20th century, the top universities began to
take it to heart in the late 1940s by changing their admis-
sions and hiring policies to emphasize intellect. They had
always had some intellectuals on board, but previously
wealth was the main way into the student body and social
connections were helpful in getting on the faculty. The
Ivy League was known for producing gentlemen, not
eggheads. As part of the new trend, Jews such as I were
admitted in larger numbers. Gelernter concludes that
intellectuals came to dominate the faculties by the early
1960s so that the first wave of students fully indoctrinat-
ed as intellectuals emerged from graduate school in the
late 1960s.
As a graduate of Yale Law School in 1968, my con-
temporaries and I who were so instrumental in helping
to launch the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, and other "public inter-
est" environmental groups were charter members of the
new wave. We felt fully entitled to remake society accord-
ing to our ideals. We thought we knew everything
because we had gotten good grades. But what passed for
reasoning was often little more than "society should do
as we think." Besides, there is more to wisdom than rea-
soning. Here again, Gelernter is helpful.
There is a crucial distinction between propositions you
arrive at by reason... and ones that are based on emo-
tion or experience or horse sense. The Talmud calls this
elusive stuff derekh eretz, literally "way of the world"-
a phrase that also means "deference" or "humility."
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One of the Talmud's deepest assertions is also one of
its simplest: yafeh talmud Torah im derekh eretz,
Torah study together with worldly experience is beauti-
ful. Ideas against a background of humility and com-
mon sense. (Some of the greatest Talmud thinkers did-
n't earn their living as rabbis; they were shoemakers,
merchants, or carpenters.)
Yet, according to the new elite, only those who earn their
living by thinking are thinkers.
Having dismissed the great bulk of humanity as lack-
ing in thoughtfulness, we considered ourselves entitled to
far more power than comes from one vote at the polling
place. We looked down on government as it then operat-
ed because society seemed to us to be moving too slowly
toward the ideals we admired. As the chant went:
What do we want?
[insert the ideal of the day]
When do we want it?
Now!
We wanted new kinds of statutes that would force
agencies to bend society to our ideals on a timetable. One
of these statutes was the 1970 Clean Air Act. It mandated
that EPA protect the health of all Americans from all
harmful pollutants by the end of the 1970s without
regard to cost. As a young attorney at the Natural
Resources Defense Council, I saw my role as forcing EPA
to live up to this ideal. A quarter century of experience
has taught me that legislation by ideal is unkind to people
and their society.
The ideals become real only in the concrete. Protect-
health-from-pollution-without-regard-to-cost is only an
ideal until there are laws requiring real people to reduce
pollution to the required extent. In enacting ideals
instead of rules of private conduct (such as emission lim-
its on specific kinds of plants), Congress does only half
the job of making law; it creates rights without imposing
corresponding duties. It does the popular and shuns the
unpopular part of lawmaking.
It is mistaken to think that Congress could do a better
job by legislating ideals instead of rules of conduct
because, in legislating ideals, it disengages itself from the
interests that must give way if the ideals are to be realized.
Legislators and agency officials cannot know whether
they really believe in achieving their loudly proclaimed
ideals until they face up to the interests that must give
way to achieve them. It turned out that achieving the
ideal of the 1970 Clean Air Act would have required tak-
ing most of the cars off the roads in Los Angeles and halt-
ing construction of new factories in many areas with
high unemployment. No one in public office was willing
to defend such results.
Members of Congress of course also use legislation by
ideal to evade democratic accountability in fields other
than pollution control. They freely enact absolutist ideals
in the form of mandates on lower levels of government
(such as to remove asbestos from the schools), entitle-
ments (such as old age pensions), or government insur-
ance (such as for buildings in flood plains). But the ideals
become real only when other legislators have to raise the
money to make it so.
It is no good trying to excuse the idealism on the basis
that there is time enough for Congress to face the hard
choices after the ideal is enacted. Statutes that launch
regulatory agencies, impose unfunded mandates, and
create entitlements are not trial balloons. People come to
depend upon the entitlements; they save less for retire-
ment in reliance on Social Security or build a house in a
flood plain in reliance on government flood insurance.
Once we get something from government, it feels like a
right that we will fight to keep, even if we would not have
missed getting it in the first place. Besides, repealing an
enacted ideal requires going through the Constitution's
legislative process. The House, the Senate, and the presi-
dent all were given a say in enacting statutes so that gov-
ernment would not act rashly. By legislating ideals, Con-
gress evades the procedural checks on acting rashly, but
those checks come fully into play in stopping new legis-
lation to temper past rashness. Besides, once Congress
legislates a new ideal, a subgovernment grows up around
it and defends itself. A legislated ideal is almost as hard to
take back as a slap in the face.
Legislation by Ideal Empowers the Unaccountable
MY GENERATION OF PETULANT YOUNG ELITISTS CAME
to understand how the magic wand of idealism could be
used to get power. The trick was to promise to achieve
some ideal, but to postpone the hard choices about how
to achieve it until later. The 1970 Clean Air Act could be
enacted because the laws needed to produce clean air
would not have to be put in place until 1977. Ideals were
postponed for present power-a far cry from the chant
"When do we want it? Now!" When 1977 arrived with
the ideal unachieved, EPA held the whip hand over soci-
ety because it theoretically had the power to stop the
building of new factories and to close gas stations on
the massive scale required to achieve the ideal. But EPA
was not about to exercise its power because then it
would lose it. Instead, the agency deigned to allow soci-
ety more time in exchange for more power. In the jock-
eying, EPA had two critical advantages-any softening
of the regulatory timetable would have to get through
the legislative process, and EPA was now itself the center
of a subgovernment with clout. In the 1977 Clean Air
Act, EPA and its allies allowed the 1977 deadline to be
eased to 1982 for some pollutants and 1987 for others in
exchange for vastly increased power to impose proce-
dural and substantive requirements on society. After
the 1977 and 1982 deadlines also proved impossible, the
1990 Clean Air Act allowed the deadlines to be eased
out as far as 2010 in exchange for still greater increases
in power.
But as things stood after the 1990 legislation, EPA'S
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power was a depleting asset. Enough time was passing
that the agency's health standards would be largely met
by 2010. In 1996, EPA promulgated new, tougher stan-
dards that project its power far beyond 2010. Many
mayors and governors, including many Democrats,
think the standards are wasteful, unnecessary to pro-
tect health, and impossible to achieve. The agency
replies that it will decide later on, case by case, whether
to give them more time to meet the goal. With gover-
nors and mayors having to seek the agency's grace, it
will have still more power.
Less Pollution but More Anxiety
THE GREAT CONCENTRATION OF POWER WORKED
through legislation by ideal cannot be justified by good
results. The air people breathe is much cleaner today not
because of the ideal handed down from Washington but
because society wanted it so. As Indur Goklany shows in
his essay in The Common Law and the Environment: Rethink-
ing the Statutory Basis for Modern Environmental Law, state
and local governments responded to the demands of vot-
ers for cleaner air long before the national government
got involved-and progress was as quick before Wash-
ington took over as it was afterwards. The national gov-
ernment's most important contribution to clean air was
not some abstract ideal but the enactment by Congress in
1970 of a concrete rule of conduct requiring a 90 percent
cut in emissions from new vehicles. Public support for
cleaner air would have prompted legislatures at all levels
of government to enact further concrete steps to reduce
pollution. But, instead of enacting other concrete laws in
response to popular demand, Congress evaded the hard
choices by enacting its grand ideal.
One might hope that legislation by ideal would make
people worry less about pollution because a national EPA
is standing guard. After all, we want to feel safe as well as
be safe. But the idealistic approach has left us feeling
unsafe. According to opinion polls, the public is more
worried about the environment now than it was in the
1970s. The public worries more despite dramatic
decreases in pollution because the idealistic approach
puts EPA in the business of getting the public to worry
about our "failure" to attain unattainable ideals. The
agency and others who get power and money from pol-
lution control are far more ready to identify problems
and propose increases in its power than to say things are
reasonably safe. With the drumbeat of missed dead-
lines-and all the money EPA spends, and gives to its sup-
porters to spend, to arouse anxiety no wonder the pub-
lic worries more.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of EPA's success at
worry-mongering is the irony that a majority of people
worry that the majority of people do not worry enough
about pollution. (Sixty-eight percent of the public have this
worry, according to one poll.) Thus the same public that got
government to do something substantial about pollution
have been convinced by the same government that people
like themselves are too dumb to get the government to pro-
tect them. Government by ideal creates a state-literally a
state of mind-in which people feel power must be ceded
to an unaccountable administrative state.
Government by Ideal Results in Excruciatingly
Detailed Regulation
MY COMPLAINT IS NOT THAT EPA MOVED TOO FAST TO
clean the air. Indeed, it was woefully slow in some
instances, such as lead in gasoline and interstate pollu-
tion. My complaint is that without legislation by ideal we
would have achieved comparable improvements in pub-
lic health with much less harm to society.
The Clean Air Act, and the many other statutes mod-
eled on it, allow a federal agency to run major segments of
civil society on quasi-military lines through a chain of
command that runs from Congress down through EPA to
states and ultimately the regulated entities. The battle plan
begins with statutes proclaiming ideals, EPA regulations
and guidance documents giving instructions to subordi-
nate regulators, state statutes, regulations, and plans
showing compliance with the national orders, and then
the permits to, and reports from, the regulated entities.
Before 1970, progress was being made on pollution with
far less paperwork. Although the paperwork is itself a vast
waste of human time and talent, its greatest importance is
as a marker of something more subtle, the loss of flexibil-
ity that comes from trying to run society on military lines.
Not only is everything controlled directly or indirectly
from Washington, but it is controlled in great detail.
It is worth recalling how our legal system used to dis-
courage antisocial activity. As a rough generality, if you
acted wrongly but caused no harm, you paid token dam-
ages or nothing at all. No harm, no foul. If you did wrong-
ly cause damage, you paid for it, but were not punished
unless you did something society judged awful. It was
because only awful conduct was made a crime that igno-
rance of the law was no defense-you should have
known better.
Such an approach would not work for many modern
environmental concerns because it is hard for judges to
place a dollar value on the harm done by many pollu-
tants. But, for those pollutants, legislatures have many
fairly nonintrusive ways to limit total emissions from all
sources or total emissions from any one plant.
Our modern environmental statutes control conduct
in far more detail than that. Instead of limiting total emis-
sions from each plant, the regulatory system frequently
slaps a separate emission limit on every one of the many
smokestacks, pipes, and vents coming out of the typical
plant. The agency regulates not only emissions but some-
times also the techniques used to control them, monitor
them, and report them. All this must be pinned down in
a permit to be secured before going into operation. And
to get the permit you must pay a tax sufficient to keep the
regulators in business. Also, if the source needs to change
what it is producing or how it operates, which can hap-
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pen every few weeks in this computer age, it will need an
amended permit.
No major facility can hope to avoid violating such a
compulsive system of legally binding requirements. As a
recently published environmental law treatise acknowl-
edges, "it is virtually impossible for a major company (or
government facility) to be in complete compliance with
all regulatory requirements. [And yet] virtually every
instance of noncompliance can be readily translated into
a [criminal] violation." (Celia Campbell-Mohn, Barry
Been, and William J. Futtrell, Sustainable Environmental
Law.) Government now uses the criminal law, "civil"
penalties, and other sanctions to punish much conduct
that is neither harmful nor intentional and that ordinary
people would not think reprehensible.
Government by Ideal Costs Little People
BIG CORPORATIONS CAN LIVE WITH GOVERNMENT BY
ideal. In truth, they often come to like it. They can cope
with its complications because they have in-house staffs
and outside lawyers, often hired away from "public interest
groups" and EPA. The specialists know that their livelihoods
come from the administrative state. The corporations
must, of course, pay for the staffs and pollution control
itself. But because their large competitors bear a similar
burden, the costs can be passed along to consumers.
The compulsive system of crime and punishment is
more of a problem for state and local governments, farm-
ers, and small businesses. Also harmed are homeowners
or other property owners with wetlands, asbestos, lead
paint, or radon problems, for example. Unlike large cor-
porations, those people are not well equipped to deal
with highly complex regulatory requirements.
Smaller businesses face additional problems. Quickly
growing small firms are kept from building new plants to
compete with established firms because the regulations
give a large preference to existing plants. Big businesses
love the protection from competition. Because big busi-
nesses have many ways to use federal regulation to pro-
tect themselves from competition, major new EPA regula-
tions sometimes even increase the price of their stock, as
Bruce Yandle shows in Common Sense and Common Law for
the Environment.
Households bear an average annual cost for pollu-
tion control of $1,850 per year, according to Allan Carlin
in Environmental Investments: The Cost of a Clean Environment.
That counts only the direct costs of control, such as capi-
tal equipment and operating costs. The indirect costs due
to paperwork requirements and stifling innovations are
larger still. Michael Hazilla and Raymond Kopp's study
"Social Cost of Environmental Quality: A General Equi-
librium" estimats that the Clean Air and the Clean Water
acts alone reduced national income 2 percent by 1981
and 6 percent by 1990. That loss in income grows cumu-
latively and, moreover, takes account of only two of the
many environmental statutes.
Such numbers, by themselves, do not prove that pol-
lution control is too expensive. We gladly would pay
more to avoid unmitigated pollution. The question is
whether we could get equivalent protection for less. We
can. The best estimates are that a more flexible system
could have achieved the present level of environmental
quality at one-fourth the cost.
Government by Ideal Stifles Initiative and Creativity
WE ARE HURT NOT JUST IN OUR POCKETBOOKS BUT IN
our ability to live our lives in ways that are most fulfill-
ing to us. When I talk with friends and neighbors about
what they would really like to do, they often mention
developing some talent into a little business that they
could operate on their own or in conjunction with a few
friends. What usually stops their hopes before they stir
far is feeling daunted by the various regulatory and
record-keeping requirements, of which the environmen-
tal laws are but one of many examples. Some people
decide to proceed anyway, but illegally. They become
new recruits to the underground economy. Others do
not go underground, but cut corners and are left worry-
ing about getting caught. Most, however, stay where they
are, cogs in large organizations. The large organizations
provide the capacity to deal with the government-
imposed complication, but at the price of doing things
the organization's way. Small businesses are right to see
the state as their enemy..
I do not want to exaggerate. Plainly, small businesses
continue to flourish. But the drag on individual initiative
and creativity is real. When innovators from the private
or public sectors explain their success in finding new or
better ways to provide people with what they want, the
stories they tell often show that it was tougher jumping
through the regulatory hoops than coming up with the
idea or implementing it. The stories that we do not hear
are of the innovations that died because getting the per-
mits was just too expensive, too time consuming, or too
discouraging. It is a sign of the times that the artists Chris-
to and Jeanne-Claude, whose projects include wrapping
public monuments in gossamer fabrics, make their years-
long efforts to get the necessary permits part of the work
of art. In art, as it imitates life, government is a drag on
individual creativity.
When the state throttles individual initiative, we lose
something even more precious than money and what it
can buy. We lose society. Marvin Devino, our nearest
neighbor in upstate New York, fixes the tractors and
trucks of local farmers and loggers not just for money,
but also for company. When he complained of being too
busy, I told him, as I had learned as a good intellectual,
that he might be able to work less and earn more by rais-
ing his prices. His reply: "But, then I wouldn't get to see
my friends."
Legislation by ideal is puritanical. It upholds virtue in
the sense of pious adherence to notions of purity, but
destroys virtue in the sense of using our personal powers
to express ourselves to the fullest. And it does so relent-
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lessly. As the philosopher C.S. Lewis wrote in "The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment,"
Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the
good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may
be better to live under robber barons than under
omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cru-
elty may sometime sleep, his cupidity may at some
point be satiated; but those who torment us for our
own good will torment us without end for they do so
with the approval of their own conscience. They may
be more likely to go to Heaven yet at the same time
likelier to make a Hell of earth. Their very kindness
stings with intolerable insult. To be "cured" against
one's will and cured of a state we may not regard as
disease is to be put on a level with those who have not
yet reached the age of reason or those who never will;
to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic
animals.
The idealist intellectuals who began pouring out of
the top graduate schools in the late 1960s thought of our-
selves as committed to peace, freedom, and the love of
humanity. Despite our talk of peace and freedom, we
launched regulatory systems that work on quasi-military
lines and that unnecessarily curb freedom. Despite our
talk of love, our idealism has taken a form that is the con-
trary of love. To love another human is to see that being
as a whole and hope for the full realization of that whole-
ness. To impose idealism on society is to focus on one
aspect of other people-their desire for clean air, for
instance-and insist that that aspect should trump all
others. Such conduct would in the days of the counter-
culture have been called "laying a guilt trip." The state
runs on guilt and anxiety.
The Beauty of the Common Law
BY COMPARISON TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, THE
common law has many beautiful features. First, its rules
of liability proscribe conduct that society deems unjust.
In contrast, the administrative state's rules of liability are
expedients to its ends.
Second, common law decisionmakers (judges)-
unlike those of the administrative state (Congress and
EPA) -do not gain in power or prestige by changing the
rules. Common law rules are, metaphorically speaking,
boundaries between holders of rights. Cases arise
because of uncertainty about how the boundaries apply
in particular instances and so will arise no matter where
the boundaries are. Congress, however, gains in power by
granting EPA broader jurisdiction, and EPA gains in power
by using that jurisdiction aggressively, as when it ratchets
up the stringency of its ambient standards. It is an empire
builder. That is not what the court had in mind when it
stated in the first modern environmental law case that an
agency charged with protecting the environment should
not be an "umpire blandly calling balls and strikes."
(Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 454 F.2d 608,
620 (2d Cir., 1965).)
Third, the common law takes an evolutionary
approach to lawmaking, while the administrative state
works through great spasms of legislative authorization.
As Andrew Morriss points out in his essay in The Common
Law and the Environment: Rethinking the Statutory Basis for
Modern Environmental Law, the common law works in light
of the very real facts of real cases while the cataclysmic
statutory authorizations of the administrative state are
premised perforce on imagined facts. It was imagined
facts that gave rise to such goofy notions as "technology
forcing," which was supposedly to let us achieve the
Clean Air Act's absolute health goals in the 1970s. The
common law was tied to real facts because it could issue
orders only to those who had been given personal notice
and a right to a hearing. In contrast, the administrative
state stakes out its turf through abstractly framed autho-
rizing statutes that leave most people uninformed of
what is likely to happen to them and give them no per-
sonal notice until it is too late.
Fourth, common law rules tend to be cost sensitive,
while those of the administrative state are often not even
supposed to take cost into account.
Fifth and finally, the common law relies principally on
private ordering, while the administrative state, with its
command-and-control mindset seeks to order vast
swaths of human activity through top-down power. The
common law provides rules for dealing with externalities,
but otherwise leaves decisions about whether to control
pollution-and how-up to private persons. So, for
example, the common law prefers compensating or pre-
venting harm rather than requiring adherence to the law
as an abstract duty. Also, those with duties and rights
under the common law are usually free to trade them. In
contrast with the administrative state, all rights are
inalienable, and duties may be swapped, as with emissions
trading, only if the jealous administrative state approves.
How to Protect the Environment in the Spirit
of the Common Law
WE CAN HAVE A WORKABLE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
that is more like the common law and less like the fiats of
the administrative state. The place to start is the common
law. It is still the chief regulator of pollution, at least
between rural neighbors. But it cannot do the whole job.
Supplementing it with legislation can be perfectly con-
sistent with the rule of law. Indeed, the common law
needs legislation to rescue it when lines of cases go down
blind alleys, as Friederich Hayek argued. We also some-
times need legislation to paint bright lines, take account of
changes in society, and construct remedies for pollution
that is not certain to cause harm but does present signifi-
cant risk. For Hayek, the key difference between the rule
of law and the fiats of the administrative state was not that
one was made by judges and the other made by politi-
cians, but that law proscribes only unjust conduct.
There is, of course, no way to guarantee that legislat-
REGULATION VOLUME 22, No. 1
ed law will proscribe only unjust conduct or, indeed,
reflect any of the other beautiful attributes of the com-
mon law. But we can shift the odds in our favor by chang-
ing legislative lawmaking in two fundamental ways.
First, the national government should deal only with
those environmental issues that the states are institution-
ally incompetent to handle. As I have previously argued
in REGULATION, that would leave most regulation at the
state and local level. There is no intellectually respectable
case for the continued national dominance over pollution
control. The old case has been decimated by the theoreti-
cal work of Richard Revesz, the statistical work of Indur
Goklany, and my own work that documents the gap
between the promise and performance of the administra-
tive state.
Second, legislation, whether at the federal, state, or
local level, should be restricted to enacting rules of con-
duct rather than such abstract ideals as "protect health."
In other words, legislatures should not delegate the
power to make law to administrative agencies. I have
published a book that shows this is feasible.
These two changes would increase the likelihood that
legislated rules of conduct would have the virtues of the
common law. The rules would tend to be in accord with
the values of society because they would be made by leg-
islators operating locally and accountable to the electorate
on a local basis rather than by the functionaries of a
national agency largely insulated from popular control.
No longer could legislators escape responsibility by enact-
ing pious ideals instead of rules of conduct. Having to take
responsibility for the hard choices, they would lose their
stake in expanding the power of the state. To the contrary,
they would be inclined to intervene only where existing
law is deficient. Their intervention would be likely to take
the form of limited fixes rather than authorizing the
imposition of whole new systems. For example, when
Congress found itself forced to enact a rule of conduct to
limit emissions of new cars in 1970, it enacted an emission
limit only for new cars. The rest of the 1970 Clean Air Act
delegated broad-ranging lawmaking power to EPA. But,
were delegation foreclosed, further congressional inter-
ventions would likely be limited to specific categories of
plants, or even specific categories of plants in a specific
region. Or Congress would enact common law-like rules
of the sort that Professor Thomas Merrill suggests for con-
trolling interstate pollution.
Such lawmaking would tend to replicate additional
virtues of the common law. It would be evolutionary
rather than cataclysmic, based on real rather than imag-
ined facts, and cost-sensitive rather than pretending to be
cost-ignorant. Because particular industries would be
targeted, they will press to defend themselves. As a result,
the proponents of legislation would bear the burden of
showing why the legislation is really needed to prevent
harm and is a proportionate response to it. Moreover,
because the elected legislators would be responsible for
the consequences, they would find it to their advantage to
allow scope for private ordering. We see evidence of that
in the acid rain program under the 1990 Clean Air Act.
With Congress on the hook for the costs, the statute
allowed emissions trading.
I do not want to claim too much for the legislative
process at the state and local level. It is subject to manip-
ulation by concentrated interests and logrolling. But Con-
gress and the executive branch are fully amenable to the
same evils. (In the executive, the pejorative "logrolling"
gets the positive spin of "coalition building.") But when
the regulations come from state and local legislatures
rather than EPA functionaries, we know just whom to
blame if we do not like the results. The state and local leg-
islators will be up for reelection soon, and it will not cost
a king's ransom to unseat them, or at least make them
sweat enough so that they will pay more heed to us.
The results will reflect human foibles, but to reject
that is to reject the roots of modern environmentalism.
Aldo Leopold, its spiritual father, set out to teach ordi-
nary people about the environment because he believed
that those who do not understand nature will make bad
decisions about it. No understanding is needed for Con-
gress to promise rosy ideals or for people to put blind
faith in their administration by a remote EPA. But its envi-
ronmental fiats come down from on high, whereas
Leopold wanted to save the environment from the bot-
tom up. His vision was not unlike that of the Framers of
the Constitution, many of whom were thoughtful natu-
ralists. They sought to root the laws in popular support
by requiring that they be made by elected legislators.
Such laws will reflect human nature and so therefore will
not be perfect. But the quarter century since Earth Day
has demonstrated a corollary to Leopold's teaching:
those who cannot accept human nature will make bad
decisions about how government should protect nature.
Democratic accountability should be among the natural
resources that environmental law defends.
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